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WHY TITLE VII'S PARTICIPATION CLAUSE
NEEDS TO BE BROADLY INTERPRETED TO
PROTECT THOSE INVOLVED IN INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS
MAY M. MANSOURt
INTRODUCTION

Imagine being the Human Resources Director of a company
when a fellow coworker comes to you alleging that she has been
sexually harassed by the Vice President of the company, who, by
the way, also happens to be the husband of the President and
part owner of the company. You do what you think it is your job
to do, namely, begin to conduct an internal investigation of the
allegations.1 However, before the investigation is completed, you
are terminated by none other than the company's President. It
seems like you have a perfect claim against your employer under
the anti-retaliation clause of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, right?2
After all, you were fired because you were
participating in an investigation of alleged discrimination
against your employer. Wrong-at least this is what the Second
Circuit recently held3 following a disturbing line of cases that ban
employee claims of retaliation that are merely linked to internal
investigations. 4
' Symposium Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2014, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2006, CUNY Hunter. The author
would like to thank Professor David Gregory for his guidance and support in
completing this Note.
1 In its analysis, this Note makes no distinction between a human resources
director and other employees.
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, § 704(a), 78 Stat. 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)).
' See Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 44-46 (2d Cir. 2012). For
a full discussion of this case, see infra Part II.E.
4 See, e.g., Hatmaker v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 746-47 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the "investigation" referred to in Title VII does not include internal
employer investigations (internal quotation marks omitted)); Correa v. Mana Prods.,
Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 319, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a human resources
manager who participated in an internal investigation was not protected by the
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Out of a total of 99,947 individual charge filings of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") in 2011, over thirty percent were claims of
retaliation under Title VIIF There has been an eleven percent
increase in the number of retaliation claims since 1997.6 This
significant increase highlights the importance of having
legislation that ensures the protection of employees from their
employers' unjustified retaliation. One of these laws, which has
been largely successful in providing such protection, is Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7
Title VII "created the first effective federal prohibition
against employment discrimination," and gave employees an
avenue by which to protect themselves and seek redress for such
discrimination.
Title VII's protections fall under two main

participation clause of Title VII); Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419,
428 (5th Cir. 2000) ("In the instant case, the 'participation clause' is irrelevant
because Byers's [sic] did not file a charge with the EEOC until after the alleged
retaliatory discharge took place."); EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171,
1174 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the participation clause of Title VII does not
protect an employee who participated in an employer's internal investigation);
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 581 (6th Cir. 2000) ("To establish a
claim of retaliation under the participation clause, [a] [p]laintiff must make a prima
facie case by showing that [the] [d]efendants discharged him because he filed a claim
with the EEOC."); Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that an employee who makes accusations against an employer during an internal
investigation does so at the employee's own "peril"); Booker v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the protection of the
participation clause is triggered only after the initiation of a statutory proceeding);
Bick v. City of N.Y., No. 95CIV.8781(KMW)(MHD), 1997 WL 381801, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 10, 1997) (dismissing an employee's retaliation claim because she did not
engage in "protected activity" under Title VII when she made statements during an
internal investigation (internal quotation marks omitted)).
U.S. EQUAL EMPL'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Charge Statistics FY 1997
Through FY 2013, http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm?
renderforprint=l. In 2011, the EEOC reported 31,429 claims of retaliation under
Title VII; this made up 31.4% of all claims reported to the EEOC, which is the
highest amount of reported claims made under this statute since 1997. Id. This
number obviously does not include those employees who were retaliated against for
their involvement in an employer's internal investigation, but did not file a claim
with the EEOC. One can only imagine the actual number of people affected by this
type of discrimination.
6 See id. In 1997, a total of 80,680 claims were filed with the EEOC, 16,394 of
which were retaliation claims under Title VII. Id.
7 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, § 704(a), 78 Stat. 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)).
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sections: section 703(a)(1)(2)' and section 704(a).1" While section
703(a)(1)-(2) protects employees from being discriminated
against based on their "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin,"1 1 section 704(a) protects employees from being retaliated
against by their employers. 12 In other words, section 704(a),
which is also known as the anti-retaliation provision, was
Congress's attempt to provide protection for employees who were
not discriminated against on the basis of who they were or how
they looked, but because of the actions that they decided to take
against their employers.1 3
The anti-retaliation provision reads in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment.., because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter. 14
The anti-retaliation provision can be further broken down
into two parts: (1) the "opposition" clause15 and (2) the
"participation" clause.16 This Note is primarily concerned with
the participation clause, though it will make reference to the
opposition clause as well as some of the courts' interpretations of
the opposition clause to support its assertion. Even though the
participation clause affords employees necessary protection
against their employers, courts have consistently limited its

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1)-(2).
Id. § 704(a).
11 Id. § 703(a)(1)-(2).
10

12

Id. § 704(a).

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3(a) (2012)).
13
14

15 Id.
16 Id.

The section of the statute that reads that it is "an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants
for employment.., because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter," is the opposition clause. Id. The section of
the statute that reads that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment.., because
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter," is the participation
clause. Id.
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scope by interpreting "investigation ... under this subchapter"17
as applying only to those employees who are participating in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing that is connected to a
formal EEOC charge.18 This Note argues that this narrow
interpretation of the statute is contrary to the intention and aim
of Title VII and, in turn, should be interpreted more broadly.
Part I of this Note gives a brief explanation of the meaning and
purpose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Part II focuses
on some of the cases that have limited the application of the
participation clause to employees who are involved in formal
EEOC proceedings. In particular, it focuses on the most recent
Second Circuit case, Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc.,19 to
examine the dangers presented by such a limited interpretation.
Part III of this Note discusses several reasons why such a narrow
interpretation should be avoided. Finally, the Note concludes in
Part IV by arguing that courts should interpret the participation
clause more broadly, urging them to take into consideration cases
which have interpreted Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
broadly and to give deference to the EEOC, which also interprets
the provision broadly.
I.

THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION

The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibits retaliation by an employer against an
employee who has been involved in protected activity.2 °
Protected activity consists of (1) opposing a practice that the
various discrimination statutes have made illegal, or (2) "filing a
charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the applicable
statute. 2 1
Id.
See infra Part II for cases illustrating this interpretation. Courts have held
that this phrase refers to Subchapter VI of Chapter 21 of Title 42, which, among
other things, explains the procedures and enforcement powers of the EEOC. See
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012). Therefore, courts have concluded
that Congress's intention was to restrict the participation clause, applying it only to
investigations followed by a formal EEOC charge. See Townsend v. Benjamin
Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221
F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000).
19 679 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012).
21 U.S. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-I(A) (1998) [hereinafter EEOC Manual],
availableat http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf.
21 Id.
17

is
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A.

The "Opposition"Clause
An employee who opposes an employer's action that is made
illegal by the various discrimination statutes is engaged in
protected activity.2 2
The statute's protection applies to an
employee who has made an explicit or an implicit communication
to his employer that he believes its actions are discriminatory
and in violation of the discrimination statutes.2 3 The statute's
enforcing agency, the EEOC, has provided examples of what
constitutes opposition: (1) a threat to file a charge that alleges
discrimination; (2) a complaint, formal or otherwise, about
discrimination; and (3) a refusal to obey orders for the belief that
they are discriminatory.2 4
The opposition clause has two key limitations, which narrow
its coverage. The first limitation applies to the manner by which
an employee may oppose alleged discrimination, allowing only for
"reasonable" opposition. 2' The second limitation of this clause is
that employees must base their opposition on a "reasonable and
good faith belief' that the employer's practices were unlawful.26
These limitations become significant in advocating for a broader
interpretation of the participation clause, since employees may
find themselves without redress for an employer's retaliatory
actions if they are unable to bring a claim under the opposition
clause.27
B.

The "Participation"
Clause
The participation clause does not have the same limitations
of reasonableness and good faith that are included in the
opposition clause. Therefore, even if the original allegations were
not valid or reasonable, an employee may still be protected by the

Id.
Id. § 8-II(B)(1).
24 Id. § 8-II(B)(2).
25 Id. § 8-II(B)(3)(a). While courts have cited public criticism of an employer and
peaceful picketing as reasonable methods of opposition, they have refused to
recognize excessive actions-such as the searching and copying of confidential
materials, the badgering of co-employees to get them to testify in support, or any
illegal activity-as reasonable. See O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79
F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996); Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.
1990); Jackson v. St. Joseph State Hosp., 840 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (8th Cir. 1988).
2' EEOC Manual, supra note 20, § 8-II(B)(3)(b)(8-8).
27 See infra Part III.
22
23
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participation clause. 2 As it reads in pertinent part, this clause
protects an employee from discriminatory retaliation if "he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter. '29 Despite the broader reach of this clause as
compared to the opposition clause, courts have interpreted
"under this subchapter" narrowly to apply only to those
employees who have filed a claim with the EEOC. 3' The unfair
effect of such an interpretation is that employees who have
participated in internal investigations, which are not otherwise
linked to formal EEOC charges, are left without redress under
the participation clause.3 1
Not only does this narrow
interpretation unnecessarily limit an employee's options for
redress, it also runs afoul of the intent of the statute.3 2
While there is not much evidence of Congress's intent as it
relates specifically to the anti-retaliation provision, courts have
consistently held that the goal of this legislation is to prevent
employers from interfering with employees who are seeking to
oppose or remedy discrimination.3 3 From these cases, it becomes
clear that Congress's main concern was to ensure an "increased

21

See EEOC Manual, supra note 20, § 8-II(C)(2)(8-9). This distinction is

important because an employer that retaliates against an employee will usually not

be saved under the participation clause by claiming that the employee lied or
otherwise acted unreasonably or in bad faith. See, e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35
F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994).
29 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a).
o See supra note 4.
31 See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters. Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2012).
32 In her dissent in Clover v. Total System Services, Inc., Justice Henderson

stated:
To hold ... that an employee is protected if she makes a statement to an
investigator for the government agency but is not protected if she makes
the identical statement, concerning the same allegation of discrimination,
to her employer's representative unduly weakens the assurances afforded

by the anti-retaliation provision.
Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 157 F.3d 824, 832 (11th Cir. 1998) (Henderson, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 172 F.3d 795 (11th Cir 1999.), superseded on reh'g, 176 F.3d
1346 (11th Cir. 1999).

" Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006)
(emphasizing that the anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employers from
"interfering with an employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act's
basic guarantees"); see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 338 (1997)

(highlighting that § 704(a)'s main purpose is to "maintain[] unfettered access to Title
VII's remedial mechanisms").
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statutory protection for employees" 4 and to prevent harm to
those employees who wish to take advantage of the protections
guaranteed to them under the various anti-discrimination
statutes."5 Therefore, there can be little question that Title VII's
primary objective is the prevention and deterrence of harm."
Nevertheless, despite the courts' acknowledgment of the statute's
intent, some courts seem to have disregarded it when deciding to
limit the application of Title VII's participation clause to only
those employees who are involved in a formal EEOC claim.
II.

COURTS: INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS ARE NOT "UNDER THIS
SUBCHAPTER"

Relying on a narrow interpretation of Title VII, the following
line of cases illustrate the unwillingness of the courts to grant
plaintiffs redress under the participation clause when they have
participated in an employer's internal investigation of alleged
discrimination.
A.

Vasconcelos v. Meese

In Vasconcelos v. Meese, 7 the plaintiff, Priscilla Vasconcelos,
worked with the U.S. Marshal's Service. 8 She filed a complaint
with both the EEOC and the Marshal's Service's Internal Affairs
Office against her employer for sexual harassment.3 9 However,
her EEOC complaint did not get resolved within the requisite
time, leaving her with only her employer's internal
investigation.4"
Accused of lying during the investigation,
Vasconcelos was fired, and her discharge was upheld on an
internal appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board.4 1
Vasconcelos resorted to the courts, alleging, among other things,

" Patricia A. Moore, PartingIs Such Sweet Sorrow: The Application of Title VII
to Post-Employment Retaliation,62 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 214 (1993).
" Oren R. Griffin, Avoiding Retaliation in the Higher Education Workplace in
the Aftermath of Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 227 EDUC. L. REP. 525,
526 (2008).
3" Brief for the U.S. EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant Grey-Allen
at 18, Townsend v. Benjamin Enters. Inc., 679 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 09-0197cv(L)) [hereinafter EEOC Amicus Brief].
37 907 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1990).
31 Id. at 112.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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that she had been fired in retaliation for the charges she made
against her employer but found no remedy in the district or
circuit courts.42
While she argued that she should be protected under Title
VII's participation clause regardless of whether or not she lied
during the internal investigation, the court held that the statute
did not even apply to her. 4 Looking at the statute's language,
the court rationalized that the protection of the participation
clause was limited to employees involved in a formal EEOC
proceeding and that any "charges made outside of that context
are made at the accuser's peril. 44 It is hard to believe that such
a holding can be in line with the statute's intent to prevent or
deter harm, as it puts employees in quite a predicament-should
they endure the discrimination or risk reporting it at their own
"peril," knowing that if they choose the latter, they may have no
other recourse? 4 This case is a classic example of the danger of
courts limiting the participation clause's application.
B.

EEOC v. Total System Services Inc.

In EEOC v. Total System Services Inc.,46 the plaintiff, Lindy
Warren, was fired from her job for allegedly lying during an
internal investigation of sexual harassment. 47 After complaining
to the EEOC about her termination, the EEOC filed suit on her
behalf, alleging that she was unlawfully terminated in retaliation
for complaining about her supervisor's sexual harassment during
an internal investigation, which constituted participating in
protected activity under Title VII's participation clause. 4 The
district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the EEOC did not prove that the plaintiff
had engaged in protected activity; the circuit court affirmed.49

42

Id.

41 Id.
44 Id.

at 113.
The court did not express any opinion as to whether an employee who lies
during an EEOC proceeding would be protected by the participation clause.
41 See supra Part J.B for a discussion on the legislative intent behind the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.
46 221 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2000).
41 Id. at 1173.
48 Id.
41 Id. at 1173-74.
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Despite the EEOC itself arguing that the participation
clause "must encompass taking part in an employer's internal
investigation," the court refused to recognize its argument.
Instead, the court concluded that the participation clause only
protects those involved in activities that occur after a claim has
been filed with the EEOC and that it does not protect those
employees who are involved in internal investigations. 1 In fact,
the court disturbingly noted that it did not believe that Congress
intended to "protect absolutely every sexual harassment
complaint made to an employer-no matter how informal or
knowingly false-as a protected activity under the participation
clause. 5 2 It is hard to imagine that Congress did not intend to
protect employees who complain of discrimination during an
internal investigation when the ultimate effect is perpetuation of
discriminatory actions and unavailability of redress. 3
C.

Correa v. Mana Products, Inc.
In Correa v. Mana Products, Inc., " the plaintiff was the
Human Resources/Payroll Administrator at Mana Products.5
During her time there, two Mana employees filed complaints
against the company with the New York Human Rights Division,
alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin.5
According to the plaintiff, after she investigated and documented
the incidents, Mana's Executive Vice President told her that it
was the first time that Mana was the subject of such a
complaint5 7 and that she was not satisfied with how the plaintiff
" Id. at 1174 & n.3.
Id.
52 Id.
5' This Note takes no position as to whether an employer should have to
accommodate employees who make false accusations or lie during an internal
investigation. However, an employer should not, as this court essentially holds, be
able to use this as a pretext to circumvent the clear protections of the statute by
making blanket restrictions against employees merely because they are not involved
in formal EEOC proceedings. It is worth noting, however, that the EEOC has said
that permitting an employer "to retaliate against a charging party based on its
unilateral determination that the charge was unreasonable or otherwise unjustified
would chill the rights of all individuals protected by the anti-discrimination
statutes." EEOC Manual, supranote 20, § 8-II(C)(2).
51

5'

550 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y.2008).

Id. at 322-23.
51 Id. at 323
51 Mana later admitted that there had been several employees who had
previously filed charges against the corporation with the National Labor Relations
5
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handled the situation. 8 The plaintiff was told that her write-ups
were "too editorial" and that they would cause a problem "if they
fell into the wrong hands." 9 The plaintiff was subsequently
fired. ° She sued alleging that she had been retaliated against in
violation of Title VII.6 1 In granting summary judgment for the
defendants, despite acknowledging that the Second Circuit had
previously "recognized the explicit language of § 704(a)'s
participation clause as being expansive and containing seemingly
no limitations, ' 2 the district court held that the language of
section 704(a) only protected participation under a proceeding
that was connected to a formal investigation. 3
D. Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Center
In Hatmaker v. Memorial Medical Center,14 the plaintiff,
Janet Hatmaker, was a part-time Chaplain at Memorial Medical
Center Hospital."5 When the director of the hospital died, one of
the reverends, Greg Stafford, was appointed as acting director
while the hospital searched for a permanent replacement. 6 In
searching for a replacement, the Chief Human Resources Officer,
Forrest Hester, asked staff members for their opinions about
Stafford. 7 In response to Hester's solicitation, Hatmaker sent an
e-mail voicing concern about Stafford's presentation of himself in
public and his discriminatory treatment of women, expressing
her belief that he would not be qualified for the position. 8
After receiving this email, Hester started an internal
investigation to rule out discrimination. 9 At the end of the
investigation, Hester concluded that there was no discrimination
and informed Hatmaker that she should resign if she was
Board, claiming that they had been discriminated against in retaliation for their
unionizing efforts. Id. at 323 n.2. Mana also admitted that the corporation had been
previously sued by employees. Id.

" Id. at 323.
" Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 322.
62

Id. at 328 (citing Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003)).

63

Id. at 329.

64

619 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2010).

6'

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

66
67
6S
69

742.
743.
743-44.
744.

TITE VII'S PARTICIPATION CLA USE

2014]

uncomfortable working with Stafford; she was subsequently
suspended for thirty days.7" At the end of her suspension,
Hatmaker was fired "for the comfort of all concerned."7 1 She sued
the hospital alleging that she was fired in retaliation for
participating in an internal investigation.7 2 The district court
granted summary judgment for the hospital, and the circuit court
affirmed.73
In its decision, the circuit court emphasized that Hatmaker's
communications
were connected to a "purely internal
investigation of possible sex discrimination,"7 4 and that an
employer's investigation was "distinct from one by an official
body authorized to enforce Title VII." 75 In its rationale, the court
incorrectly emphasized the validity of the plaintiffs claim,
concluding that her claim did not even have a "valid core."7 " Just
as in EEOC v. Total System Services Inc., the court misplaced its
analysis on the validity of the claim.7 7
This is a dangerous precedent, which blurs the distinction
between two separate arguments. Whether an employee should
be penalized for making a false claim is a separate issue from
whether an employee involved in an internal investigation is
protected under Title VII from an employer's retaliation.7"
Employees with valid claims of discrimination should be able to
seek a remedy when they are unjustly terminated from their
positions or otherwise suffer adverse consequences due to their
involvement with an internal investigation. It is unfair to deny
these employees the protection of the statute merely because
there are others who may make false claims. Using this logic,
should all employees involved in formal EEOC proceedings be
left without the protection of Title VII's participation clause
because there are some who may file false claims? No court
would be able to hold such because it would be a clear

7 Id. at 745.
71
72

73
71

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 743.

Id.
Id. at 745.

71 Id. at 747.
71 See id. at 746.
77 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the protection of the

participation clause did not extend to an employee who has lied during internal
investigations); see also supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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contradiction of the statute itself and its legislative intent. Why
then are courts so willing to merge these two distinct issues for
internal investigations?
E.

Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc.
The most recent, and perhaps the most disturbing case that
follows this flawed line of reasoning, is Townsend v. Benjamin
Enterprises, Inc.79 In ruling on an issue of first impression, the
Second Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs claim, holding that she did not engage in protected
activity under Title VII's participation clause when she
participated in an employer's internal investigation that was not
connected to a formal charge with the EEOC.80
Co-plaintiff Martha Townsend approached co-plaintiff
Karlean Grey-Allen, who was serving as the Human Resources
Director of Benjamin Enterprises Incorporated ("BEI").81
Townsend alleged that Hugh Benjamin, the Vice President and
husband of the President of BEI, had sexually harassed her on
numerous occasions. 2 In response, Grey-Allen called the New
York State Division of Human Rights, which suggested that she
separate Hugh Benjamin from Townsend and interview him to
see what happened.8 3 Operating under this advice, Grey-Allen
asked Hugh Benjamin to work from home. 4 During her efforts to
investigate the matter, Grey-Allen also sought the advice of
Dennis Barnett, a management consultant retained by BEI, who
she considered a mentor.85
When BEI's president, Michelle
Benjamin, found out about this conversation, she fired GreyAllen the same day, alleging that Grey-Allen had breached
confidentiality when she spoke with Barnett."6 Subsequently,
Michelle Benjamin took over the investigation, allowed Hugh
Benjamin to return back to work, and concluded that the claims
were unfounded.8

79 679 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012).

o Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 46.
82

Id.

83
84

Id.
Id.

85

Id.

86 Id.
87

Id.
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Focusing on the language of the statute in making its
decision, the Second Circuit held that the participation clause
only referred to proceedings "under this subchapter," which
meant specifically under Subchapter VI of Chapter 21 of Title
42.8 The court explained that this Subchapter was primarily
devoted to describing the EEOC's procedures and enforcement
powers, ultimately concluding that the statute refers only to the
investigations that are connected to a formal EEOC charge and
not to informal internal investigations. 9
In making its decision, the court refused to give deference to
the EEOC's interpretation of the statute as submitted in an
amicus brief, which urged the court to include internal
investigations under its reading of the statute." The court also
dismissed Grey-Allen's argument that internal investigations
should be considered protected activity because they are essential
to the aim and effectiveness of Title VII. 1 Instead, the court was
concerned only with what it interpreted to be the "plain language
of the participation clause," dismissing an analysis that took the
legislative intent of the statute into consideration. 2 In so doing,
the court's decision ultimately ran afoul of the intent of Title VII,
leaving a plaintiff who was fired under the pretext of a breach of
confidentiality without a remedy for her employer's retaliation. 3
III. WHY PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNAL INVESTIGATION SHOULD
BE PROTECTED ACTIVITY

A.

GrantingEmployees Protection Under the Participation
Clause Encourages Cooperationin InternalInvestigations,
Furtheringthe Goals of Title VII

As demonstrated by the preceding cases, plaintiffs who are
retaliated against for participating in internal investigations are

" Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 Id.

9' Id. at 50 n.10. The EEOC itself includes "[c]ooperating with an internal
investigation of alleged discriminatory practices" as part of the list of protected
activity under the participation clause. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, Facts About Retaliation, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/facts-retal.cfm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2015).
91 Townsend, 679 F.3d at 50-51.
92 Id.
" See supra Part 1.B for a discussion on the legislative intent behind the antiretaliation provision of Title VII.

838

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:825

often left without a remedy, while employers continue retaliating
against their employees without even as much as a reprimand.
Aware of the possibility that their employment may be negatively
impacted-or even terminated-for participating in their
employer's investigation, employees may be hesitant, and
rightfully so, to come forward and speak out against
discrimination.9 4
Employees, aware that they will not be protected under the
participation clause for being involved in an internal
investigation that is not connected with a formal EEOC claim,
will be reluctant to cooperate. 9 This "[flear of retaliation is the
leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing their
concerns about bias and discrimination." 6
Allowing antiretaliatory protection under the participation clause for internal
investigations, as is allowed under the opposition clause, would
not only alleviate these fears but would also "promote employees'
cooperation when their employers investigate discrimination
allegations.'"
When employees are reluctant to come forward with
allegations of discrimination or to cooperate in internal
investigations due to fear of retaliation, this runs afoul of the
purpose of Title VII to prevent and remedy discrimination. 9 The
purpose of Title VII is furthered mostly through the willingness
of employees to speak up against discriminatory practices. 99
Therefore, voluntary participation is key to the effective
enforcement of Title VII. 100 Leaving an employee without remedy
" See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation,90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005).
" The EEOC has noted that those charged with investigating claims will not
investigate them if they believe they may be retaliated against, and that victims of
discrimination will likely not complain when they in turn realize that their
complaints will go uninvestigated. See EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 13.
96 Brake, supra note 94.
Megan E. Mowrey, Discriminatory Retaliation: Title VII Protection for the
CooperatingEmployee, 29 PACE L. REV. 689, 691 (2009).
9 See supra Part J.B for a discussion of Congress's intent. See also Alex B. Long,
The Troublemaker's Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of
Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 935 (2007) (arguing that limiting
the protection of the participation clause "diminishes the ability of Title VII to carry
out its mission of combating workplace discrimination").
" See EEOC Manual, supra note 20.
...See id; see also Brake, supra note 94 ("To a large extent, the effectiveness and
very legitimacy of discrimination law turns on people's ability to raise concerns
about discrimination without fear of retaliation."); Long, supra note 98, at 936 (Title
VII's "protection from retaliation would be an empty promise without the ability and
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for an employer's discriminatory retaliation "would have a
chilling effect upon the willingness of individuals to speak out
against employment discrimination or to participate in the
EEOC's
administrative
process
or other
employment
1 1
discrimination proceedings.""
Many acts of discrimination
would be left unreported, and those discriminated against would
have a hard time finding witnesses that would be willing to help
them in purely internal investigations.
Not only does participation in internal investigations
ultimately promote Title VII's purpose of preventing and
remedying discrimination, it also promotes Congress's "intention
to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII
context.10 2 When employers establish their own internal
grievance procedures and investigations, they can potentially
"limit liability, provide more informal, efficient means of
conciliation,
and eliminate
costly and time-consuming
litigation," ' 3 in effect, furthering Congress's intention.
A.

The Alternative Is Too Narrow, ProvidingLimited Protection

Not only does a lack of protection under the participation
clause for employees involved in internal investigations result in
some instances of discrimination to go unreported and,
ultimately, unremedied, but it also leaves some employees with
10 4
limited recourse. Despite its recent expansive interpretation,
the opposition clause is nevertheless limited in scope and "does
not protect employees sufficiently."' '
In order to utilize the
protection of the opposition clause, employees must meet two
requirements: (1) the manner used to oppose the alleged
willingness of coworkers to assist ... without fear of employer reprisal"); Mowrey,
supra note 97, at 693 ("Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of

employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses." (quoting
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006))).
101
102
103

See EEOC Manual, supra note 20.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
Dorothy E. Larkin, ParticipationAnxiety: Should Title VII's Participation

Clause Protect Employees Participatingin Internal Investigations, 33 GA. L. REV.
1181, 1181 n.2 (1999).
104 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S.
271, 271 (2009) (holding that the opposition clause protected an employee who did
not actively oppose her employer's discriminatory action, but rather merely

answered questions during her employer's investigation).
...Larkin, supra note 103, at 1217; see also supra notes 25-27

accompanying text.

and
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discrimination must be "reasonable" ' and (2) the employee must
have a "reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed
1 7
practices were unlawful.""
In other words, the courts must
weigh the public's interest and the employee's right to oppose
discrimination against the employer's need for work productivity
and stability to decide whether or not the employee's manner of
opposition was reasonable and whether the employee reasonably
and truthfully believed that the employer's actions were illegal. 0 '
These two requirements will often preclude plaintiffs from
successfully asserting the protection of the opposition clause.0 9
With some employees unable to find a remedy under the
opposition clause and unable to turn to the participation clause,
they find themselves in an uncomfortable situation; do they
refuse to speak out against discrimination by refusing to
participate in internal investigations in whatever capacity, or do
they speak out and possibly run the risk of losing their job?
What courts seemingly fail to realize is that by taking away
the availability of the participation clause in cases involving only
internal investigations, they are inadvertently rewarding those
employers who are quick to fire employees. Many courts seem to
acknowledge that if only employees had first filed a claim with
the EEOC before participating in an internal investigation, they
would have been protected under the participation clause.1
In
essence, these courts are rewarding employers for their quick
termination of employees, while punishing the employee who
decides to seek an internal remedy prior to going to the EEOC.11

106 EEOC Manual, supra note 20, § 8-II(B)(3)(a).
107 Id. § 8-II(B)(3)(b).

10s
Id. § 8-II(B)(3)(a); see also Hatmaker v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 747
(7th Cir. 2010) ("[O]pposition, to be protected by the statute, must be based on a
good-faith (that is, honest) and reasonable belief that it is opposition to a statutory
violation.").
109 See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 47-48 & n.4 (2d
Cir. 2012) (finding that the plaintiff did not have a good faith belief that the
employee was sexually harassed, and that she was just doing her job by conducting
an internal investigation); Hatmaker, 619 F.3d at 747-48 (holding that the plaintiff
failed to meet the good faith requirement); EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d
1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying the plaintiff relief under the opposition clause);
Correa v. Mana Prods., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 319, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that
the plaintiff failed to show evidence of specific acts opposing the employer's actions).
110 See supra note 4.
111 See Long, supra note 98, at 957 (arguing that even though an employer can
foresee that a formal EEOC charge will follow soon after an internal complaint is
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Courts should take into consideration that the participation
clause does not have the same strict requirements of the
opposition clause 112 and that it may be the employee's only
alternative in opposing an employer's retaliatory actions;
therefore, courts should not deny employees access to its
protection merely because they have not filed formal EEOC
charges.
IV. INTERPRETING THE CLAUSE BROADLY TO EXTEND
PROTECTION

To ensure that employees receive proper protection under
Title VII and that courts stay true to the purpose of the statute,
courts should interpret the participation clause broadly. Courts
can accomplish this broad interpretation regardless of whether
they apply the "plain meaning" or "purposive" approach to
statutory interpretation.
A.

PlainMeaning Approach

Courts that use the plain meaning approach base their
interpretations on the literal meaning of a statute's text. 1 3
Under this approach, the court is able to analyze the statute as a
whole, as well as "consider[] ... dictionaries and grammar
books ... analogous provisions in other statutes, canons of
construction, and the common sense God gave us."1 4 The Second
Circuit in Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises,Inc. claimed that it
used this approach in reaching its decision that an
"investigation ... under this subchapter" banned employees from
recovering under the participation clause when they were merely
1
involved in internal investigations."
However, in reaching its
decision, the court relied only on the fact that other parts of the
subchapter described the EEOC and its procedures. 1 The Court
filed, it "would theoretically be immune from a future retaliation claim" if it takes
action against the employee before such formal charges).
112 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
113 Larkin, supra note 103, at 1207.
114 Natasha Dasani, Class Actions and

the Interpretationof Monetary Damages
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 177-78
(2006) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115 679 F.3d at 49 ("[T]he plain language of the participation clause does not
include participation in an internal employer investigation unrelated to a formal
EEOC charge.").
116 Id.
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relied on precedent and persuasive authority, which similarly
held that the plain meaning approach did not support the
plaintiffs claim.117 The Court failed to consider the other tools
available to it for its analysis. For example, the EEOC provided
the Court with dictionary meanings of the word "under" that
could have changed its analysis."' Substituting the word "under"
for one of those definitions, the statute in pertinent part would
have read: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer
to
discriminate
against
any
of
his
employees.., because he has.., participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing [subject to the authority,
control, direction, or guidance of 1 9 ] this subchapter. 1 20 Reading
the statute in this way, courts using the plain meaning approach
would be able to conclude that Congress intended employee
participation in internal investigations to be protected regardless
of whether they were connected to a formal EEOC charge.
Courts using the plain meaning approach can also use
similar provisions from other statutes to help them interpret the
plain meaning of the statute in question.1 21 In the case
Hechinger Investment Company of Delaware, Inc. v. Hechinger
Liquidation Trust,1 22 looking at the plain meaning of the word
"under" as it related to a federal tax provision, then-Judge Alito
stated that "[w]hen an action is said to be taken 'under' a
provision of law or a document having legal effect, what is
generally meant is that the action is 'authorized' by the provision
of law or legal document. 1 23 A similar conclusion was reached by
the Supreme Court in Ardestani v. INS. 124 There, after referring
to several dictionaries and six other cases from the United States
117 Id. at 49 & n.8.
118 EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 15 ("required by: in accordance with:

bound by" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2487 (Merriam Webster Inc., 1986)); see also infra note

119 and accompanying text.
119 Id. (citing LESLEY BROWN,

NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

3469 (Oxford University Press et al., 1993)).
120
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(2012)).
121 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
122 335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003).
123 Id. at 252 ("Thus, if a claim is asserted 'under' 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 1983

provides the authority for the claim. If a motion is made 'under' Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), that rule provides the authority for the motion. If benefits are paid 'under' a
pension or welfare plan, the payments are authorized by the plan.").
124

502 U.S. 129 (1991).
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Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that the plain
meaning of "under" was "subject to" or "governed by. 125
Therefore, drawing upon these cases in the context of Title VII,
courts could easily interpret "investigation under this
subchapter" to mean investigations authorized by Title VII,
which would include internal employer investigations that try to
12
remedy and avoid discrimination made illegal by the statute.
Looking at the statute as a whole to further understand the
plain meaning of "investigation under this subchapter,1 ' 27 courts
will see that when it wanted to, Congress has clearly stated its
intention that the EEOC conduct investigations.1 2 If Congress
intended to limit the participation clause to only investigations
conducted by the EEOC, it could have expressly done so, as it has
in other parts of Title VII.1 29 In a statute that elsewhere
specifically makes reference to EEOC investigations, the lack of
this specific reference in other parts is likely intentional, leaving
room for courts to interpret it broadly to include internal
employer investigations.
Therefore, courts using the plain
meaning approach to statutory interpretation should have no
problem extending the protection of the participation clause to
employees who have faced retaliatory action in response to their
participation in an employer's internal investigation.
B.

PurposiveApproach

While some courts may still be hesitant to conclude that the
plain meaning approach can support an interpretation of Title
VII that protects employees involved in internal investigations,
there can be no doubt that a purposive approach, which takes
121

Id. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).

126

See Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 157 F.3d 824, 832 (11th Cir. 1998)

(Henderson, J., dissenting), vacated, 172 F.3d 795 (11th Cir 1999.), superseded on
reh'g, 176 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1999).

Id.

In my view, it is equally reasonable to read the statutory language to mean
any investigation into an employment practice rendered illegal by Title VII.
Thus, an employee would be protected by the participation clause once an
investigation was begun into conduct which allegedly violated the statute
even if a formal EEOC complaint was not in existence at that time.
127 Looking

at the statute in its totality is another tool available to a court when

using the plain meaning approach. See Dasani, supra note 114.

12' EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 14-15 (making reference to various
instances when Congress has specifically authorized investigations by the EEOC).
129 Id.
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into consideration the purpose and intent of Title VII, would lead
to a broader interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision that
would comfortably lead to this conclusion.
Rather than being solely concerned with the exact wording of
the statute, the purposive approach to statutory interpretation
also takes into consideration the legislative intent of the
statute.130 In applying this approach, courts are able to "remain
13
faithful to the purpose and intent of the statute.""
This
approach is especially important in the context of Title VII's antiretaliation provision to ensure the adequate protection of
employees who speak out against discrimination and participate
in investigations that help uncover and remedy illegal acts of
discrimination in the workplace.
C.

Courts Have Interpreted the Anti-RetaliationProvision of
Title VII Broadly

Even though the legislative history of Title VII's retaliatory
provision is limited, it is likely that Congress intended the
provision to be ambiguous, leaving room for the courts to
interpret it liberally. 3 2 Referring to the legislative intent of Title
VII as a whole, 33 courts have consistently acknowledged that a
broad interpretation is necessary to remain true to the statute's
purpose; some have even expressly rejected a strict reading of the
statute.3
Following this reasoning, courts should interpret the
130 See Dasani, supra note 114, at 180.
131 Id. at 181.
132 See RICHARD H. POFF & WILLIAM C. CRAMER, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 2112-13. Though clearly hostile to Congress's ambiguous

drafting of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, the report nevertheless
acknowledges that the language is ambiguous and that courts will likely interpret it
broadly:
While we are unprepared to say that the ambiguity is deliberate and
calculated, it is difficult to believe that it is altogether accidental. Statutory
ambiguities require judicial interpretation. In light of the trend court
decisions have taken in recent years, it is not unrealistic to predict that the
interpretations the courts would make would be of the broadest possible
scope.

Id. at 2112.
133 For a discussion on Title VII's statutory intent, see supra Part I.B.
134 See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) ("It
is ...the duty of the courts to make sure that [Title VII] works, and the intent of
Congress is not hampered by a combination of a strict construction of the statute
and a battle with semantics."); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006) (extending the protection of Title VII by refusing to limit the
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participation clause broadly to include employees who suffer
retaliation in response to their participation in internal
investigations. In fact, the purpose of Title VII-to prevent
employers from interfering with employees who are seeking to
oppose
or
remedy
discrimination-demands
this
interpretation.13
The Supreme Court's holdings in several recent cases also
lend support to a broad reading of the participation clause. In
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee,1 3 the Supreme Court had no problem holding
that the opposition clause of Title VII protected an employee
fired in retaliation for answering questions during an employer's
internal investigation.1 3 7 The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's
ruling that the opposition clause did not protect an employee who
did not herself initiate a complaint against an employer, holding
that to find otherwise would be inconsistent with the statute's
purpose.1 38
The Supreme Court again expanded the protection of Title
VII in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.139 Delivering
the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
plain meaning of the anti-retaliation provision and the
provision's purpose support a broad interpretation.14 ° In so
acknowledging, the Court held that a third party could bring a
retaliation claim under Title VII. 14 1 The plaintiff in this case was
fired from his job after his fiancee, who worked at the same
harm that the statute forbids to only those actions that are related to employment or
occur at the workplace, reasoning that "such a limited construction" would not be
consistent with the statute's purpose); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346
(1997) (holding that although Title VII clearly only refers to "employees," in order to
uphold the purpose of Title VII-"[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms"-it must be read to include former employees); Deravin v.
Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the "the explicit language
of § 704(a)'s participation clause is expansive and seemingly contains no
limitations"); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999)
("The words 'participate in any manner' express Congress' intent to confer
'exceptionally broad protection' upon employees covered by Title VII.") (quoting
Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969)).
13 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's
purpose).
136 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
137
131
139

Id. at 277-78.
See id. at 279.
131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).

140 See id. at 868.
141 See id.
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company, filed a charge of sex discrimination against their
employer. 142 The Court had little difficulty reaching its decision
that the plaintiff was retaliated against for his fianc6e's actions
and was therefore protected by the anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII, despite his status as a third party.1 43
Courts presented with cases under Title VII's participation
clause should follow the Supreme Court's example of interpreting
the statute broadly and promoting the legislative purpose and
intent of the statute.
Courts should break free from the
disturbing line of cases that has continued to deny employees
relief when they have been merely cooperating in their employers'
internal investigations. It is crucial to Title VII's success in
avoiding and remedying workplace discrimination that the
participation clause be interpreted broadly.
D. The EEOC Supports a Broad Interpretationof the AntiRetaliation Provision of Title VII
The EEOC, the agency that has been given the task by
Congress to interpret, administer, and enforce Title VII, is
supportive of a broad interpretation.1"
While courts are not
bound by the interpretations of the EEOC, they have consistently
looked to it for guidance in the Title VII context. 45 In reaching
its decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.,146
the Supreme Court referred to the EEOC's Manual for guidance
in broadly interpreting the anti-retaliation provision. 47
In

142

Id. at 867.

143 See id. at 870.
144 EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 1.
145 Though not binding, EEOC interpretations

should nevertheless be given
deference when possible. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) ("We
consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts,... do constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) ("The
administrative interpretation of the [Civil Rights] Act by the enforcing agency is
entitled to great deference."); EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 22 ("Although
the EEOC's interpretation is not controlling, it does reflect a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance
and, as such, is at least entitled to a measure of respect by the Court.") (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399

(2008).
146

548 U.S. 53 (2006).

147

Id. at 65-66.
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Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,148 the Supreme Court again agreed
with the EEOC's interpretation of the statute, acknowledging
that "[t]he EEOC quite persuasively maintains that it would be
destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation provision for an
employer to be able to retaliate with impunity against an entire
'
class of acts under Title VII." 149
In the participation clause context, the EEOC expressly
includes the involvement in internal investigations of alleged
discrimination as a protected activity under the participation
clause.1"'
Furthermore, in its amicus brief submitted to the
Court of Appeals in Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises, Inc., the
EEOC makes clear that in an effort to further the remedial
purpose of Title VII, "[flor more than ten years ... [it] has
interpreted the participation clause to cover internal
1 1
investigations.""
The court in Townsend erred in not giving
deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the participation
clause. Courts confronted with a similar case should construe
the language of the participation clause broadly and give
deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision; the purpose of Title VII would be better served if they
do.
CONCLUSION

With more and more employees filing claims of employer
retaliation with the EEOC, courts should be careful not to
narrowly interpret the participation clause of Title VII so as to
deny these employees its protections. Courts have acknowledged
time and again that Title VII was broadly written and should be
interpreted accordingly. Title VII was passed by Congress to ban
an employer from taking discriminatory actions against its
employees. Congress intended for the statute to prevent and, if
necessary, to remedy discrimination.
Specifically, under its anti-retaliation provision, Title VII
bans an employer from retaliating against its employees when
they oppose its discriminatory actions. This provision is crucial
to promoting the protections of Title VII. Without the safeguards

14s

149

519 U.S. 337 (1997).
Id. at 346.

150 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

1

EEOC Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 22.
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of this provision, employees will hesitate to speak out against
discrimination
for fear of the consequences,
leaving
discrimination unremedied and employers unpunished.
Despite its importance, however, courts have limited the
protection of the anti-retaliation provision, namely by limiting
the scope of the participation clause to apply only to those
employees who are involved in formal EEOC proceedings. Courts
should understand that this is a dangerous precedent. By
narrowly interpreting the participation clause, not only are
courts deviating from the purpose of Title VII, they are leaving
employees who are already faced with a restrictive opposition
clause with limited recourse.
There is no reason why the participation clause should not
be interpreted liberally to protect employees who are involved in
internal investigations. Both the plain meaning and purposive
approaches to statutory interpretation support such an
interpretation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged that the anti-retaliation provision should be
construed liberally and has in fact done just that in its decisions.
Courts presented with cases under Title VII's participation
clause should follow the Supreme Court's example and interpret
the clause broadly, thereby promoting the legislative purpose and
intent of the statute and affording employees necessary
protections against their employers. Courts need to break free
from the disturbing precedent of limiting the scope of the
participation clause, which is stifling employee protections and
inadvertently rewarding employers for their discriminatory
behavior. Only then will the aim of the anti-retaliation provision
be promoted.

